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Abstract
We present a number of modal logics to reason about group norms. As a pre-
liminary step, we discuss the ontological status of the group to which the norms are
applied, by adapting the classification made by Christian List of collective attitudes
into aggregated, common, and corporate attitudes. Accordingly, we shall introduce
modality to capture aggregated, common, and corporate group norms. We investigate
then the principles for reasoning about those types of modalities. Finally, we discuss
the relationship between group norms and types of collective responsibility.
Keywords. Group norms, Group agency, Non-normal modal logics, Collective Attitudes, Deontic
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1 Introduction
Logics for representing and reasoning about norms are very important in knowledge repre-
sentation and multiagent systems as they allow for compactly express desirable properties
of the agents’ behaviour as well as the fine principles of interaction among agents. In this
paper, we propose a logic to reason about group norms, that is, norms that apply to col-
lectivities of individuals. In order to conceptually understand the nature of the group to
which the norms are ascribed, we use the distinction made by Christian List among collec-
tive propositional attitudes [10]. We view norms as propositional attitudes, endorsing the
tradition in analytic philosophy that legitimates the representation of beliefs, desires, and
also norms, by means of a modal logic constructed on top of a classical propositional logic.
The modalities are in fact intended to capture the mode of relationship between an agent
and a propositional content, allowing us to represent the attitude of the agent with respect
to the proposition. In case of deontic attitudes, the modality express the normative force
holding between an agent and a state of affairs represented by a proposition.
A collective propositional attitude is, generally speaking, a propositional attitude that is
ascribed to a collective entity. A map of the most salient notions of collective attitudes was
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proposed in [10], by distinguishing between three kinds of collective attitudes: aggregate,
common, and corporate attitudes. Corporate attitudes presuppose that the collectivity to
which the attitudes are ascribed is an agent in its own right, an agent who is ontologically
distinguished from the mere individuals that compose the collectivity. Common attitudes
are ascribed to collectivities by requiring that every member of the group share the same
attitude. Common attitudes have been presupposed for instance by the debate on joint action
and collective intentionality [23, 10, 12]. In this view, possible divergences among the
attitudes of the members of the group are excluded. For instance, under this reading, the
sentence “PC members are supposed to return the review by the deadline” is true only if
every individual who is a PC member is actually committed to meet the constraint.
By contrast, aggregative attitudes do not presuppose that every member of the group
share the same attitude. In this case, a propositional attitude can be ascribed to the col-
lectivity by solving the possible disagreement by means of a voting procedure such as the
majority rule. For instance, a sentence like “the parliament decided to reduce taxation”
does not require that every member of the parliament actually endorses the proposal, rather,
it means that a suitable winning coalition of members of the parliament votes for the pro-
posal.
We may view the three types of collective attitudes as generating three kinds of groups
that differ in the relationship between the group and its members. We shall use this dis-
tinction in order to approach a taxonomy of group norms. We shall follow in particular the
analysis of group norms provided by [2, 1] where group norms are classified according to a
number of parameters, such as the addressee of the norm, those that are responsible for the
commitment to the norm, and those who are subject to the norm.
In this paper, we shall assume that norms constraint the actions of individuals or groups.
For that reason, as a preliminary investigation, we shall study the principle of agency of
individuals and groups by discussing the logic of agency that we may assume for those types
of agents. The notion of action that we endorse in this paper is very general and abstract, as
we do not want to narrow it by assuming demanding constraints nor any specific ontological
view of actions. In particular, we shall place our analysis within the logic of action based
on the tradition of the bringing-it-about modality [5, 8]. We introduce three logics to model
the actions of groups defined in a common, aggregative, and corporate way. By means of
this logics, we shall discuss the logical relationship between the actions of the group and
the actions of its members. Then, we will approach a deontic logic for modelling group
norms by making explicit how the collective responsibility may or may not transfer to the
individuals that are members of the group.
On the technical side, the contribution of this paper is the following. We shall intro-
duce three logics to discuss group actions that reflect the common, the aggregate, and the
corporate view. To model those logics, we shall use non-normal modal logics defined by
means of neighbourhood semantics, see [4] and [14] for an introduction. A number of spe-
cific principles for the modalities that express common, aggregated, and corporate actions
is introduced by specifying both an Hilbert system to reason about those modalities and
a semantic framework based on neighbourhood semantics to ensure soundness and com-
pleteness. Although the presentation of this paper is rather informal, we shall present the
conditions on the neighbourhood functions that are required in order to prove soundness and
completeness of the systems that we introduce. Finally, we shall introduce the principles
of the deontic modalities that relate collective and individual responsibility, we study the
Hilbert system for them, and we present the relevant semantic conditions.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we remind the basics
of non-normal or minimal modal logics and we present the logics to treat individual actions
and obligations. Section 3 is dedicated to present the logics of group agency, by distin-
guishing common, aggregated, and corporate actions. Section 4 approaches the treatment
of group norms by introducing a number of modalities for collective obligation. Section 5
concludes and indicates future work.
2 Minimal modal logics
We propose a number of logics to reason about actions and obligations of individuals and
collectives. We assume a (finite) set of agents N, and we consider the power set of N, 2N,
to talk about coalitions of agents. Thus, our labels that denote agents shall range over 2N.
To express individual propositional attitudes, we admit singleton coalitions; in that case the
meaning of a coalition C is {i}.1
We shall use minimal (or non-normal) modalities in order to ensure a number of basic
principles to reason about agency of groups and individuals.
The semantics of the modalities that we are going to introduce is defined by mean of a
neighbourhood semantics [4]. LetW be a set of possible wolds (or states), a neighbourhood
function is a mapping N : W → P(P(W )) that associates a world m with a set of sets
of worlds (see [4, 14]). The intuitive meaning of the neighbourhood function is that it
associates to each world a set of propositions that are those propositions designated to hold
at w. In this setting, a neighbourhood function associates to a world w the propositions that
express the available actions or the salient norm at w.
The language of propositional logic is defined as follows. Let Prop be a set of proposi-
tional atoms,
L ::= p ∈ Prop | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ
A valuation v is a function that associates a possible world and propositional atom to
the set of truth-value {t, f}, that is v :W × Prop→ {t, f}.
1This move is quite similar to the approach in [22] to discuss coalitional ability.
We define the extension of a formula ϕ in a model by ||ϕ|| = {w | w |= ϕ}. The
semantic definition of the modalities that we shall encounter follows the following pattern,
where 2 be one of the modality that we will introduce.
w |= 2ϕ iff ||ϕ|| ∈ N(w) (1)
In non-normal modal logics, soundness and completeness are basically achieved by
means of selecting the suitable conditions on the neighbourhood functions, see for instance
[4]. In the following sections, we shall spell out the relevant conditions to achieve soundness
and completeness of the proposed logics, however, for reasons of space, we shall leave a
detailed proof of those results for future work.
2.1 Individual Actions and Obligations
The logic to reason about actions that we use here is based on the minimal logic of bringing-
it-about, which was traditionally developed by [5, 8]. The principles of this logic aim to
capture a very weak view of actions that, for instance, does not presuppose intentionality or
explicit goals. We apply this minimal view to conceptualise collective actions of different
types of groups. For instance, this weak view is adequate also for an aggregative perspective
on collective actions, for which the collective is not assumed, in general, to have joint
intentionality nor any shared goal, [10].
Four principles of agency are captured by the classical bringing-it-about logic [5]. The
first corresponds to the axiom T of modal logics: Eiϕ → ϕ, it states that if an action
is brought about, then the action affects the state of the world, i.e. the formula ϕ that
represents the effects of the action holds. The second principle corresponds to the axiom
¬Ei> in classical bringing-it-about logic. It amounts to assuming that agents cannot bring
about tautologies. The motivation is that a tautology is always true, regardless what an agent
does, so if acting is construed as something that affects the state of the world, tautologies
are not apt to be the content of something that an agent actually does. The third principle
corresponds to the axiom: Eiϕ ∧ Eiψ → Ei(ϕ ∧ ψ). The fourth item allows for viewing
bringing it about as a modality, validating the rule of equivalents: if ` ϕ↔ ψ then ` Eiϕ↔
Eiψ.
The language of the logic of bringing it about BIAT, LBIAT simply extends the language
of propositional logic by adding a formula Eiϕ for each individual i ∈ N.
The Hilbert system for BIAT is obtained by adding the following axioms (Table 1) and
the following rule to those of classical propositional logic.
` ϕ↔ ψ Ei(re)` Eiϕ↔ Eiψ
- All the propositional tautologies
E1 Eiϕ→ ϕ
E2 Eiϕ ∧ Eiψ → Ei(ϕ ∧ ψ)
E3 ¬Ei>
Table 1: Axioms of BIAT
The semantics of BIAT is obtained by adding a number of neighbourhood functionsNEi ,
one for each agent i ∈ N. Each neighbourhood function represents the actions available
to each agent at a certain world. The semantics clause for action modalities is then the
following one:
w |= Eiϕ iff ||ϕ|| ∈ NEi (w) (2)
To ensure soundness and completeness for this E, a number of conditions on the neigh-
bourhood functions has to be ensured. For the details, we refer to [8].
2.2 Individual norms
We extend the language of classical propositional logic by adding a number of modalities for
obligationsOi, for i ∈ N. For the sake of simplification, we use the standard deontic logic to
model individual obligations. The Hilbert system for OL extends the case of propositional
logic by adding the axioms in Table 2 and by adding the following rule.
- All the propositional tautologies
O1 Oi(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Oiϕ→ Oiψ)
O2 Oiϕ→ ¬Oi¬ϕ
Table 2: Axioms of OL
` ϕ Oi(nec)` Oiϕ
Although standard deontic logic is a normal modal logic, we can present its semantics
in terms of neighbourhood functions as well [4, 14]. Moreover, a condition on the neigh-
bourhood function for validating O2 is required 2
The semantics of OL can be obtained by adding a number of neighbourhood functions
NOi , one for each agent i ∈ N. In this case, the neighbourhood functions represent the
norms that are salient for an agent at a certain world. The semantic definitions for deontic
modalities are then the following one:
w |= Oiϕ iff ||ϕ|| ∈ NOi (w) (3)
3 Group actions
We introduce three modalities for capturing a number of features of group actions, that shall
be related to group norms. Here we are going to distinguish between common, aggregate,
and corporate group actions, and we are going to introduce three modalities and three logics
that capture their minimal principles. In particular, we highlight the principles that relates
the group action with the actions of the individuals that are part of the group.
3.1 Common group actions
Common group actions are intended as those actions for which every agent of the group
is indeed performing a same type of action. The axioms that govern this modality are
presented in Table 3.
COM1 again reflects the effectivity of acting. COM2 and COM3 specify how to com-
bine common actions. COM4, again, prevents tautologies to be brought about.
COM5 may in principle be questionable, as it forces the idea that the group in this case
cannot do anything more that what its members jointly do. We assume it here, by endorsing
a strict view of common group actions, which are in fact entirely reducible to the joint
actions of the members of the group. COM6 is again questionable. For instance, suppose
that every member of a parliament order a pizza, would we infer that the parliament as a
group is ordering a pizza? To account for this delicate aspects, we need to separate actions
that are done by individuals qua members of the group. We leave this points for a future
dedicated work.
The rule of equivalents for common actions is expressed in the following [COM]C(re)
rule.
2The use of non-normal modal logic to express deontic modalities was motivated in [4, 7, 18]. Moreover,
non-normal deontic logics have been used to discuss institutional agency in [3] and to model weak permissions
in [21]. We present here the semantic definitions in terms of neighbourhood semantics as it will be useful for
simplifying the subsequent arguments.
- All the propositional tautologies
COM1 [COM]Cϕ→ ϕ
COM2 [COM]Cϕ ∧ [COM]Cψ → [COM]C(ϕ ∧ ψ)
COM3 [COM]Cϕ ∧ [COM]Dϕ→ [COM]C∪Dϕ
COM4 ¬[COM]C>




Table 3: Axioms of [COM ]
` ϕ↔ ψ [COM]C(re)` [COM]tCϕ↔ [COM]Cψ
The semantics of the [COM]C modalities is defined as follows. For each modality, we
introduce a number of neighbourhood function NCOMC , one for each coalition of agents.
w |= [COM]Cϕ iff ||ϕ|| ∈ NCOMC (w) (4)
To semantically validate axioms from COM1 to COM4, the conditions are similar to
those presented for the individual logics of action and for the extension to coalitions pro-
posed by [22].





NEi (w) for every w ∈W (5)
By means of 5, we can show that axioms COM5 and COM6 are valid as follows.
For instance, we show that, for every model and every w ∈ W , w |= [COM]Cϕ →∧
i∈C Eiϕ (which, in fact, provides the soundness of axiom COM5 and COM6). Assume
w |= [COM]Cϕ, then ||ϕ|| ∈ NCOMC (w). Then, by condition 5, ||ϕ|| ∈ NEi (w), therefore
w |= Eiϕ.
3.2 Aggregated group actions
Aggregated actions are those that result from the outcome of an aggregation procedure,
such as the majority rule, applied to the actions of the individuals. We write [AGG]fCϕ
to express that ϕ is the action performed by the group C under the aggregation procedure
f . An aggregation function is a function that maps N -tuples of 0s and 1s associated to
formulas to the set {0, 1}, i.e., f : {1, 0}N → {1, 0}. That is, f maps patterns of individual
acceptance or rejections of formulas to a collective acceptance or rejection of a formula.
For instance, in the simple majority rule, we assume that maj returns 1 on a majority of 1s,
and it returns 0 in any other case. As a simplification move, we suppose in this paper that
N is odd.
maj(x1, . . . , xN ) =
{
1 if |{xi | xi = 1}| > N/2;
0 otherwise
By adjusting the acceptance threshold of n/2, we can define the class of uniform quota
rules, where each q provides a distinct aggregation procedure.
quotaq(x1, . . . , xN ) =
{
1 if |{xi | xi = 1}| > q;
0 otherwise
One may discuss the properties of such aggregators, along the lines of the traditional
arguments in social choice theory and judgment aggregation [9]. For instance, the previous
aggregators are anonymous, namely any permutation of the individual values provides the
same output value. By contrast, the following two classes of aggregators, oligarchies and
dictatorships, depend on specific choices of the agents.
Oligarchies: let {i1, . . . , iL} be a set of indexes with L ≤ N ,
olig(x1, . . . , xN ) = x if olig(xi1 , . . . , xiL) = x.
Dictatorships of j: dj(x1, . . . , xN ) = xj .
In the case of olig, the oligarchy of agents xi1 , . . . , xiL decides the outcome; in the case
of dj , the sole agent j is decisive.
We extend the language of propositional logic by adding a number of modal operators
[AGG]fC that depend on the aggregator f .
L[AGG]F ::= ϕ ∈ L | [AGG]FCϕ
With this definition, as a simplification move, we are excluding possible nesting of
modalities (cf. for instance [15]). By means of the aggregation function f , we can provide
the semantics of the aggregated action modality as follows. Firstly, we associate to each
modality [AGG]fC a neighbourhood function N
f
C . The semantic clause is then, as usual, the
following one.
w |= [AGG]fCϕ iff ||ϕ|| ∈ NfC(w) (6)
Denote by χX(NEi (w)) the function that returns 1 if X ∈ NEi (w) and 0 otherwise. A
winning coalition of agents wrt. an aggregator f is, informally, a set of agents that can
determine the outcome. The neighbourhood functions that we consider for this logic have
to satisfy the following constraint.
X ∈ NfC(w) ifff(χX(Ni1(w)), . . . , χX(Nil(w))) = 1 for some {i1, . . . , il} ⊆ C (7)
That is, a proposition is accepted by the groupC under an aggregative view that depends
on the procedure f if and only if there is a winning coalition wrt. f contained in C. In
particular, in case f is the majority rule, a set of words X (i.e. roughly, a proposition) is in
NfC(w) iff X is in a majority of individual neighbourhood function Ni(w) contained in C.
The axiomatisation of aggregated group actions depends on the specific aggregation
function that we select. For instance, in [15] an axiomatisation of the majority rule is pro-
vided. Note that it is well known from the social choice and judgment aggregation literature
that the aggregation of general propositions may return inconsistent outcomes (e.g. dis-
cursive dilemmas [11].) Therefore, for preventing the logic from being inconsistent, we
shall discuss which axioms of a logic of agency to drop. One solution is to drop an axiom
of the form [AGG]fCϕ → ϕ, and permit that agents in some cases may collectively accept
contradictory propositions, without making the logic inconsistent. This solution applies to
any aggregation procedure that may return inconsistent outcomes and permit contradictory
propositions only within the scope of the [AGG]fC modalities. A second solution is to pre-
vent inconsistent propositions to be collectively accepted, by excluding them also from the
scope of the [AGG]fC modalities. This shall depend on the specific aggregation procedure
and on the conditions under which it may return inconsistent sets [6]. 3
Further principles of aggregated attitudes are left for a future dedicated work. For in-
stance, a combination axiom such as [AGG]fCϕ ∧ [AGG]fDψ → [AGG]fC∪D(ϕ ∧ ψ) requires
a careful examination of the effect of combining the outcomes of coalitions C and D wrt.
f , cf. [20].
We show at least that the rule of equivalents holds for this definition of modality. Hence,
aggregated group actions are legitimate modal operators.
3To prevent inconsistency and develop an axiom system to reason about aggregated group actions, a third
solution is to use fragments of weak relevant and linear logics, cf. [16, 17]. To design logical principles that
only combine collectively accepted propositions and maintain consistency, see [18].
` ϕ↔ ψ
[AGG]fC(re)` [AGG]fCϕ↔ [AGG]fCψ
Suppose that ` ϕ ↔ ψ, we have to show that, for every f , ||ϕ|| ∈ NfC(w) iff ψ ∈
NfC(w). The assumption entails that ||ϕ|| = ||ψ||.
We have the following chain of equivalences, which allows us to conclude:
||ϕ|| ∈ NfC(w) iff f(χ||ϕ||(Ni1(w)), . . . , χ||ϕ||(Nil(w))) = 1
iff
f(χ||ψ||(Ni1(w)), . . . , χ||ψ||(Nil(w))) = 1 iff ||ψ|| ∈ NfC(w)
To relate aggregative group actions to individual actions, we discuss the following two
alternative assumptions. Firstly, we may view only the winning coalition of agents that were
actually supporting ϕ as involved in the collective action resulting in ϕ. Secondly, we may
view the entire group of agents, namely also those that were not voting for ϕ, as collectively
bringing it about that ϕ. For instance, in case of a parliament passing a bill, we may view
only those that voted for the bill as bringing it about, or we may view the entire parliament
as acting so that the bill has passed. This distinction is reflected by selecting one between






i∈D Eiϕ where D is a winning coalition wrt f .
The conditions on the neighbourhood functions that are are required in order to make
AGG1 or AGG2 valid are, respectively, the following two.
NfC(w) ⊆ NEi (w) for every i ∈ C. (8)
NfC(w) ⊆ NEi (w) for every i ∈ D, s.t. D is a winning coalition wrt. f . (9)
Note that we can view aggregated actions as modalities because we decided to define
aggregation procedures by means of f . This forces a property of systematicity on the aggre-
gation procedure [15]. Namely, the collective acceptance only depends on the patterns of
individual acceptance. In particular, any two propositions that exhibit the same pattern of
acceptance and rejections are equally accepted or rejected. This condition restricts the class
of aggregation functions that we are considering (e.g. by rejecting non-independent or non-
neutral aggregators, see for instance [13]), but it allows us to view aggregation functions as
modalities.
3.3 Corporate group actions
A corporate view of group actions requires the commitment to the existence of a single
agent a who is the bearer of all the collective actions [10], who is in principle ontologically
distinguished by the group of agents that are members of the corporate agent [19]. The
group agent may be viewed as the reification of the group as a whole, distinguished from
any individual of the set of agents, or it may be a specific agent who acts as a representative
of the group.4 To model this view, we enrich the set of agents N with a sufficient number
of labels for group agents {a1, . . . , al} and we assume that for each coalition of agents
C ∈ 2N, there is a single group agent aC that depends on C.
The agency of the group agent aC is then expected to satisfy the same principles of
agency of a standard individual agent. The motivation for this assumption is that the in-
dividual principles of agency are those that allow us, in this setting, to view a modality as
truly agentive.
The language of corporate action modalities is defined as follows.
L[COR] ::= ϕ ∈ L | [COR]Cϕ where C ∈ 2N
To capture the principles of corporate agents, we propose axiom [COR1], that means
that the agency of the corporate agent reduces to the agency of one individual and that the
agency of such an individual can be captured by the reasoning principles of the E modality.
Corporate agents modalities are again assumed to satisfy the rule of equivalents.
- All the propositional tautologies
COR1 [COR]Cϕ→ EaCϕ where aC ∈ N ∪ {a1, . . . ,al} is a designated agent for coalition
C.
Table 4: Axioms of [COR]C
` ϕ↔ ψ [COR]a(re)` [COR]Cϕ↔ [COR]Cψ
The semantics of corporate actions modalities is then defined as usual by introducing
neighbourhood functions NCORC with the following semantic constraint.
w |= [COR]Cϕ iff ||ϕ|| ∈ NCORC (w) (10)
4Notice that a group agent is distinguished from a dictator in the sense of the dictatorial aggregation proce-
dure of Section 3.2. For instance, the group agent may not be a member of the group C.
It is easy to see that corporate agents modalities satisfy again the rule of equivalents. To
make axiom [COR1] valid, we need to assume the following constraints on the neighbour-
hood functions.
NCORC (w) ⊆ NEaC (w) for aC ∈ N and for every w ∈W . (11)
By means of condition (11), the rule of equivalents immediately follows.
Axiom [COR 1] is shown to be valid as follows. Suppose w |= [COR]Cϕ, then ||ϕ|| ∈
NCORC (w), then by condition (11), ||ϕ|| ∈ NEaC (w), so w |= EaCϕ.
We assumed the inclusion, rather then the equality, in condition 11, because we do not
want to rule out the case where aC is a standard individual agent, who acts as a representa-
tive of C in certain situations, and only part of her or his actions counts as the representative
of C.
4 Group norms
We introduce three obligation modalities that relate the normative force of the collective
obligation to the relevant type of action associated to the specific type of group.
The taxonomy of group norms proposed by [2] separates the dimension of agency and
the dimension of type of responsibility. Here, we discussed the dimension of agency by
means of the logics for [COM], [AGG], and [COR], and we approach the normative force
by introducing the following modal operators OIRC , ORRC , and OCRC to select whether the
obligation induces individual, representative, or collective responsibility (IR, RR, or CR,
respectively). We also introduce the case where the collective obligation transfers to a
winning coalition of agents that can be blamed to be responsible of the collective action,
we label this situation by WR. For instance, in the case of the aggregated view of collective
actions, one may view as responsible of the course of action only the (winning) coalition of
agents that actually supported the proposal at issue and not the whole collectivity that takes
part in the decision.
We start by presenting the general principles for transferring obligations from collective
agents to individuals or subgroups and then we shall discuss the interaction between types
of collective obligations and collective actions. We extend the language of our logic by
adding formulas of the type OYCϕ , where Y ∈ {IR,RR,CR,WR} and C ∈ 2N.
The axioms that capture in general how the collective obligation transfers to individuals




RR ORRC ϕ→ Oaϕ where a ∈ N ∪ {a1, . . . , al}.
WR OWRC ϕ→ ODϕ where D ⊆ N.
The notion of collective responsibility CR is not approached here by any specific axiom:
It is rather defined by the lack of transferability to any individual, representative, or winning
coalitions of agents.
To provide a semantics of this new modalities, we assume a number of neighbourhood
functions NYC , where Y ∈ {IR,RR,CR,WR} and C ∈ 2N ∪ {a1, . . . , al}. The truth
condition of the new modal formulas is as well presented as follows:
w |= OYCϕ iff ||ϕ|| ∈ NYC (w) for all w ∈W (12)
The constraints on the neighbourhood function that are required for the validity of the
relevant axioms are then the following.




NRRC (w) ⊆ NOa (w) for a designated agent a ∈ N ∪ {a1, . . . , al} (14)
NWRC (w) ⊆ NOD(w) for a designated D ⊆ N (15)
It is easy to see that all this modalities satisfy the rule of equivalents:
` ϕ↔ ψ OYC (re)` OYCϕ↔ OYCψ
We show for instance that condition (15) allows for establishing the validity of Axiom
WR. Assume that w |= OWRC ϕ, then ||ϕ|| ∈ NWRC (w). By means of condition 15, we have
that ||ϕ|| ∈ NOD(w), thus w |= ODϕ.
Whether the collective obligations, as such, shall also satisfy the principles of standard
deontic logic is left for future work. Here we approached obligations based on individual
responsibility (IR) and corporate responsibility (CR) by reducing them to individual obliga-
tions. The case of group obligation based on winning coalitions (WR), by contrast, requires
understanding the principles of group obligations along the lines of [18].
4.1 Discussion
We conclude by discussing a number of examples. In principle, we can permit every combi-
nation of the modalities OIRC , ORRC , and OCRC with the types of group agency [COM], [AGG],
and [COR], therefore expressing in this framework the taxonomy of [2]. In fact, we shall
see that a few cases are delicate.
Firstly, by means of IR and of the view of common group actions, we can infer that,
if the group has an obligation towards ϕ, then in this case every agent has an obligation
towards ϕ.
` OIRC [COM]Cϕ→ OiEiϕ (16)
We can show that (16) is valid as follows. Suppose w |= OIRC [COM]Cϕ, then by IR, we
conclude w |= Oi[COM]Cϕ. By Axiom O1 and COM 5, we infer that w |= Oi∧i∈C Eiϕ
and, again by O1, we conclude OiEiϕ.
Moreover, if we view the responsibility of the group action as ascribed to a representa-
tive of the agents, say a, we can infer the following principle.
` ORRC [COR]Cϕ→ OaEaϕ (17)
Assume w |= ORRC [COM]Cϕ. By Axiom RR, we infer that w |= Oa[COR]Cϕ. Then,
by COR1 and O1 we conclude OaEaϕ.
Consider now the following formula.
` ORRC [COM]Cϕ→ OaEaϕ only if a ∈ C (18)
Can we ascribe a representative responsibility to an group action defined by means of
a common action? Formula (18) is derivable in our framework, only if the representative
agent is among those in C. This makes sense since a common action of the group C is
supposed to refer to the actions of the individuals in C. Therefore, in principle, we may
allow for a representative agent of the common action, although it has to be part of the
group.
For aggregated group actions, again we may select whether the responsibility is at the
individual, coalitional, or representative level. For instance, the following formula is deriv-
able only in case we assume that every individual in C is actually bringing about ϕ, even if
she or he is voting against ϕ (cf. axiom AGG 1).
` OIRC [AGG]Cϕ→ OiEiϕ (19)
By contrast, the following formula holds in case we assume axiom AGG 2.
` OWRC [AGG]fCϕ→ OiEiϕ D ⊆ N winning coalition for f and i ∈ D. (20)
To establish (20), we reason as follows. From w |= OWRC [AGG]fCϕ, then by WR, we
have that OD[AGG]fCϕ, where D is a winning coalition wrt. f . By means of AGG2 and O1,
we infer that OiEiϕ, for i ∈ D. In this case, i.e. by assuming AGG 2 instead of AGG 1,
formula (20) fails in case the agent i is not a member of the winning coalition D.
Aggregation procedure are in fact quite versatile, as they can also be viewed as abstract
representation of the decision mechanisms of an organisation. For instance, an oligarchic
aggregation can in principle represent decisions taken at the level of the board of directors
of a company.
5 Conclusion
We have introduced three logics to reason about common, aggregative, and corporate ac-
tions, by relating the agency of the group to the agency of the individuals that are members
of the group. We have then introduced a number of deontic principles that relate collec-
tive responsibility to individual responsibility and we have discussed a few combinations of
type of group action and type of responsibility. We have informally introduced those sys-
tems, however the conditions on the neighbourhood functions that we have presented are
those that are required in order to establish soundness and completeness of our systems. By
means of the logics that we have introduced, we can provide a logical foundation, which is
also grounded in the philosophical analysis of groups developed in [10], of the taxonomy
of group norms provided in [2].
Future work shall present a detailed proof of the completeness results that we suggested
in this paper. Moreover, due to the simplicity of the systems that we have introduced, we
conjecture that they are all decidable, future work shall establish this fact. Finally, we are
interested in studying in detail the principles that relate the group action and the individual
action, in particular, by expanding the analysis of aggregated group actions and of corporate
group actions, which constitute the delicate cases.
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